← volver

«The Role of Transparency in Multiattribute Sealed-bid Procurement Auctions»


«The Role of Transparency in Multiattribute Sealed-bid Procurement Auctions»

Bernardo F. Quiroga (PUC Chile) 
Brent B. Moritz (Penn State University/University of New South Wales) 
V. Daniel R. Guide (Penn State University)

We study multiattribute procurement auctions, sometimes known as A+B auctions. Here, buyers request offers that include price and non-price attributes called “quality”, and bidders respond with bids including their price and the level of quality provided. We analyze two sealed-bid scenarios: One where the scoring rule that weighs price and quality is explicitly communicated to bidders before they submit their offers, and another where the rule is only known to the buyer and not to the bidders. In addition, we compare behavior where the scoring rule is made visible after the offers are submitted. Our experimental results show substantial losses to the buyer as a direct effect of transparency loss, even as sellers see their profits increase.

Seminario ISCI
Jueves 06 de diciembre 2018
Desde las 13.30 a las 14.30 hrs
Auditorio República 779, entrada por Domeyko 2338
Almuerzos previa inscripción desde las 13:15 hrs
Consultas a seminarios@isci.cl
Inscripciones al siguiente link:
docs.google.com/ … 1fnUc47SQ/edit#gid=0